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Abstract
According to theories of quantum gravity, spacetime may be non-fundamental. The
implications of this observation are now widely debated in the philosophy of quantum
gravity. In this paper we argue that what is often discussed under the umbrella term
of “spacetime emergence” in the philosophy of quantum gravity literature in fact
consists of a plethora of distinct and even highly different problems. We therefore
advocate to cast such debates more specifically in terms of emergent spatiotemporal
aspects as is already done in the physics literature. We first show how ambiguous
the notion of spacetime is and offer five understandings of what the problem of
spacetime emergence may still amount to. We then argue, however, that there are
many philosophical problems relating to spacetime emergence and that none of the
five understandings picks out a problem that is exceptional among these. Next,
we observe that different spatiotemporal aspects are emergent in different quantum
gravity approaches whereby speaking of quantum gravity collectively is problematic.
Finally, we illustrate how inquiries about spacetime emergence are actually aided
by conducting the investigation at the level of specific spatiotemporal aspects.
1 Introduction
In one of the seminal early papers on spacetime emergence, Nick Huggett and Chris
Wüthrich find that “as far as many quantum theories of gravity are concerned, in various
ways, familiar spacetime is not admitted at the fundamental level” (2013, 277). That
spacetime may be a non-fundamental element of reality according to theories of quantum
gravity and its consequences have since then been widely debated in the philosophy of
quantum gravity. This paper, however, warns not to forget Huggett and Wüthrich’s
easily overlooked qualification “in various ways”. More concretely, we defend the thesis
that what is often discussed under the umbrella term of “spacetime emergence” in the
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philosophy of quantum gravity literature in fact consists of a plethora of distinct and
even highly different problems.
At places, the philosophical literature can give the impression that there is one over-
arching philosophical problem associated with the emergence of spacetime in quantum
gravity. Michael Esfeld, for instance, casts his investigation in terms of “the issue of
spacetime in quantum gravity” (2019, 6). As Esfeld explains, “the issue is the emer-
gence of spacetime from something that is fundamentally not spatiotemporal” (2019, 6).
Referring to a similar issue, Baptiste Le Bihan likewise frames his discussions through
“the problem of spacetime emergence in the philosophy of quantum gravity” (2019, 7).
Apparently, we here have to do with a philosophical problem—the problem of spacetime
emergence—that cuts across the different quantum gravity approaches and concerns the
puzzling issue how spacetime can emerge if it is absent at the fundamental level of
description.
Profound as this problem of spacetime emergence in quantum gravity may appear
to be, this paper argues that the problem is ill-posed. In section 4, we argue that
without a qualification of what is meant by spacetime, there is an immediate ambigu-
ity concerning the exact circumstances under which this alleged problem of spacetime
emergence occurs. What, we might ask, is characteristic of the theoretical frameworks
where this problem is raised? Unpacking this ambiguity reveals five different types of
ways to construe ‘spacetime’ in the ‘the problem of spacetime emergence’ each coming
with its own understanding of when the problem arises. Section 5 then considers each of
these understandings more closely but argues that it is implausible that any exceptional
problem should arise in any of these circumstances. This is not to say that there are
no philosophical problems related to spacetime emergence. Rather, we argue that there
are many, but that these are tied to the emergence of specific spatiotemporal aspects,
which shall be used here to denote features that are associated with spacetime such as a
metric, manifold, dimensionality, etc. The list of philosophical problems relating to the
emergence of spatiotemporal aspects is, as such, long, but no arguments currently on
offer show that any problem among these stands out. The issue with the available under-
standings of the problem of spacetime emergence is then that, even if they succeed with
clearly picking out one of the problems on the list, none of these is an exceptional prob-
lem that warrants special attention. There are many problems of spacetime emergence,
and each of them must be considered in its own specificity.
It is, however, not just those who cast their discussions as though there were a singular
problem of spacetime emergence that must be more specific. As section 6 argues, our
points are also relevant to those who explore the implications of spacetime emergence in
quantum gravity for philosophical accounts of, for instance, mereology and composition
or existing metaphysical frameworks like Humeanism. Framing such inquiries in the
abstract as ‘spacetime emergence in quantum gravity’ is, again, simply too ambiguous
for the inquiry to be meaningful. Indeed, the differences we identify between the typical
issues posed by the emergence of the various spatiotemporal aspects imply that the
question of whether, say, Humeanism is coherent with a quantum gravity approach—
let alone spacetime emergence in quantum gravity as a whole—does very much depend
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on exactly which spatiotemporal aspects are taken to be emergent. Furthermore, and
this also applies to the alleged problem of spacetime in quantum gravity, the different
approaches to quantum gravity differ rather significantly in what spatiotemporal aspects
they take to be emergent. Different quantum gravity approaches will give different
answers to our philosophical inquiries about spacetime emergence because the answers
depend on and are specific to the spatiotemporal aspects.
On these grounds, it seems advisable to discontinue unqualified talk of spacetime
emergence since this can give a misleading impression of unanimity. Instead we advocate
to take the discussions at the level of spatiotemporal aspects. Casting the debates in
these more specific terms serves two purposes. First, it makes it manifest that there are
many interrelated, yet distinct, problems associated with “spacetime emergence.” Second,
it indicates that these problems are to be resolved by detailed (philosophical) analysis
of the particular emergent features and not through general or abstract discussions of
how spacetime as such can emerge from the non-spatiotemporal.
Now, our call for specificity may be surprising given that spacetime emergence-talk
is also widespread in the physics literature. One might counter our critique by arguing
that the philosophy of quantum gravity, in fact, simply adopts an established practice
in physics when the discussions are cast in more general terms. However, as discussed
in section 3, the spacetime emergence-talk in physics rarely suffers from the ambiguity
that is often found in the philosophical discussions. In the physics literature, it is usually
sufficiently clear from context that the unqualified claims about spacetime emergence are
meant to concern one or more specific spatiotemporal aspects. In addition, these emer-
gence claims are typically made with respect to a specified quantum gravity approach.
Thus, the proposal of this paper is, in a sense, precisely that the philosophical literature
should adopt this practice of specificity from physics. Now, this may come across as a
matter of linguistics. However, since the various spatiotemporal aspects inflict very dif-
ferent philosophical problems, insisting on specificity is not an exercise in pedantry but
central to the resolution of key issues that have been raised about spacetime emergence
in quantum gravity.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces the motivations for a theory of
quantum gravity and their relationship to the emergence of spacetime. Section 3 doc-
uments the widespread spacetime emergence-talk in both the physics and philosophy
literature on quantum gravity. Section 4 shows how ambiguous ‘spacetime’ is in the con-
text of quantum gravity and offers five understandings of what the problem of spacetime
emergence may amount to. Section 5 argues that there are many problems relating to
spacetime emergence and that none of the five understandings of the problem designates
a problem that is exceptional among these. Section 6 observes that different spatiotem-
poral aspects are emergent in different quantum gravity approaches whereby speaking
of quantum gravity collectively is problematic. Finally, this section also illustrates how
inquiries about spacetime emergence in quantum gravity are aided by conducting the
investigation at the level of spatiotemporal aspects. After this, a conclusion follows.
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2 Quantum Gravity
The majority of philosophical works on the subject take it that what goes by the label
‘quantum gravity’ is supposed to denote some future theory that consistently brings
together what is often1 considered the divided basis of modern physics: quantum theory
and general relativity. Infamously, there are many different approaches to quantum
gravity with physicists strongly disagreeing on which is the most promising. There is a
sense in which this is largely due to researchers disagreeing on what exactly the question
is in the first place.2 Typically, such a theory is assumed to successfully apply ‘the
lessons from quantum theory’ to general relativity and, hence, gravity or spacetime—
very much depending on one’s methodology and one’s interpretation of general relativity.
In particular, one may view general relativity as a theory of ‘a thing called spacetime’ or
as, first and foremost, a theory of gravity. Accordingly, either the term ‘quantisation of
spacetime’ or ‘quantisation of gravity’ is used synonymously for the research programme.
Relatedly, since a quantisation of spacetime seems to suggest that (classical) spacetime
‘emerges’ (in a loose sense yet to be spelt out) from an underlying quantum structure,
the notion ‘emergence of spacetime’—or, conversely, ‘disappearance of spacetime’—is
ubiquitous in the debate.3
Since general relativity teaches us that there is a strong connection between spacetime
and gravity, the competing takes on the research programme of quantum gravity—
theories of quantum gravity as emergent spacetime theories or as quantised gravity
theories—do exhibit overlap. It is important to note, however, that the views are not
congruent. This is crucial for the project of this paper: based on explications of quantum
gravity research as aimed at constructing theories without spacetime one could come to
expect that there is a general problem of spacetime emergence. We find this sentiment,
for example, in Joshua Norton’s writing that “[o]ne of the primary tasks in building a
quantum theory of gravity is discovering how to save spatiotemporal phenomena using
a theory which, putatively, does not include spacetime” (Norton, 2021, 50).
However, or so we insist, ‘spacetime emergence’ is not a unifying trait of all approaches
to quantum gravity: not all theories that seek to give a quantum description of gravity
do also seek to give, or even obtain, a quantum description of key aspects of spacetime,
but focus on issues like UV completion, for example.4 The important issue here is that
1Cf. Salimkhani (2018)
2“No question about quantum gravity is more difficult than the question, ‘What is the question?”’
(Wheeler, 1984, 224).
3Generally, emergence is understood in a loose sense adopted from physics. It is merely supposed
to indicate that some higher-level entity is sufficiently autonomous and novel with respect to its lower-
level ‘constituents’. Accordingly, emergence is supposed to be compatible with reduction (see Butterfield
(2011) and Crowther (2016)). Moreover, emergence is usually understood in contrast to fundamentality.
We abide by this. So, emergent stuff is non-fundamental (cf. Barnes (2012)). Note that whether some,
say, entity is fundamental does not just ask whether some entity is on the list of what there is, but
what its ontological status is—arguably, with regard to other entities. That which is fundamental is that
which is ontologically privileged: it is ontologically independent of other entities and it is what other
entities ontologically depend on (see Bennett (2017)).
4The fact that many quantum theories of gravity are divergent (and, hence, non-predictable) at high
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such theory proposals do not aim for spacetime emergence at the outset. And even if the
aims of quantum gravity research include a quantization of spacetime, this is different
from claiming that the aims include “sav[ing] spatiotemporal phenomena using a theory
which, putatively, does not include spacetime”, as Norton writes.
To summarize, spacetime emergence is not what theories of quantum gravity generally
aim at, but, prima facie, merely one of the programmatic views of what ‘applying the
lessons from quantum theory to the domain of general relativity’ might mean. The truly
general feature of all quantum gravity research is seeking a quantum theory of gravity—
hence the name. Notably, of course, this work may then result in theories where certain
spatiotemporal aspects are, in fact, absent. In so far as these spatiotemporal aspects
feature in higher-level theories, this then suggests a sense in which they are emergent.
Any philosophical problems relating to the spacetime emergence of quantum gravity as
such arise after the fact. Spacetime emergence is not built into the research programme
at the outset, and it therefore depends on the details of the theories whether there
are any well-defined problems of spacetime emergence that arise from quantum gravity
research; and what they are.
3 Spacetime Emergence-talk in Quantum Gravity
‘Spacetime emergence’-talk is frequent both in the physics and philosophy literature on
quantum gravity as this section documents. While this may give the impression that
both fields are concerned with the emergence of spacetime in general, the contexts of
the ‘spacetime emergence’-talk in the physics literature reveal, as shown below, that it
is typically just shorthand for claims about the emergence of specific spatiotemporal
aspects. This specificity is less typical in the philosophical literature, although the
philosophical claims made would require it, as this paper ultimately argues.
At the face of it, the ‘spacetime emergence’-talk in physics and philosophy is quite
similar (see table 1). The similarity is perhaps to be expected since the ‘spacetime
emergence’-talk in philosophy is purposefully inherited from the physics literature. This
is exemplified by Le Bihan writing: “This essay aims at prompting a discussion be-
tween metaphysicians about how we should best understand philosophically what has
been called by physicists working in quantum gravity ‘space emergence’” (Le Bihan,
2018b, 74).5 Accordingly, it seems that any criticism that such unqualified ‘spacetime
emergence’-talk is problematic is perhaps better directed at the physicists.
However, the superficial similarities in table 1 conceal the important difference that
‘spacetime emergence’ is only shorthand for more specific claims on the physics side
whereas this type of specificity is often absent in the philosophical discussions. The
energies (the ultraviolet limit) is known as the problem of UV completion (see Crowther and Linnemann
(2017)).




Sindoni (2012, 8) discusses “situations
where spacetime is emergent from a com-
plicated underlying quantum gravity dy-
namics.”
Le Bihan (2018a, 109) discusses some
metaphysical issues in relation to “space-
time emergence as we find it in quantum
gravity.”
Faulkner et al. (2014, 2) states that
“[a]ccording to the AdS/CFT corre-
spondence, spacetime and gravitational
physics in AdS emerge from the dynam-
ics of certain strongly-coupled conformal
field theories.”
Muntean (2015, 279) speculates with
explicit reference to AdS/CFT that
“[d]ualities are a game changer here, as
they may entail that spacetime is emer-
gent.”
Cao et al. (2017, 14) describe their work
as a “model for emergent space.”
Baron and Le Bihan (2021) ”produce
models in which spacetime has non-
spatiotemporal parts.”
Steinhaus and Thürigen (2018) titles
their paper “Emergence of spacetime in
a restricted spin-foam model”
Baron (2020) titles his paper “The curi-
ous case of spacetime emergence”
Table 1: Table with examples of ‘spacetime emergence’-talk in physics and philosophy.
former is evident from the context of the quotes on the physics-side of table 1.6 Sindoni
(2012) is more particularly interested in how Lorentzian signature (as well as diffeo-
morphism and Lorentz invariance) can emerge in generic condensed matter systems.
Faulkner et al. (2014) show how the linearized vacuum Einstein field equations are dual
to a constraint on entanglement in a conformal field theory on Minkowski spacetime
(denoted emergent dynamics below).7 Cao et al. (2017) consider states in Hilbert space
and explore how certain states can give rise to the emergence of first metric and then
manifold. Steinhaus and Thürigen (2018) find a limit of the loop quantum gravity spin
foam where the effective number of dimensions tends to zero.8 We shall return to the
details of some of these in section 5. The point here is merely that the ‘spacetime
emergence’-talk in physics is usually accompanied by further specifications in terms of
particular spatiotemporal aspects like signature, symmetry, dynamics, metric, manifold,
dimensionality, etc. In other words, ‘spacetime emergence’-talk in physics is superfluous,
abstract gloss—the actual work is done in the concrete.9
This specificity from context is not always found on the philosophy side. Le Bihan
6We are not thereby saying that the unqualified ‘spacetime emergence’-talk is unproblematic in
physics, but at least the context disambiguates it.
7Since this is a duality relation, it is questionable whether this is actually an instance of emergence
as pointed out by Teh (2013), Dieks et al. (2015), Jaksland and Linnemann (2020), among others. This
issue, however, is orthogonal to the present discussion.
8More precisely, they calculate the spectral dimensions.
9Note that we make no claim about the necessary and sufficient conditions for what counts as space-
time, nor for what qualifies as a spatiotemporal aspects. We merely point out that ‘spacetime emergence’-
talk in the physics literature is associated with the mentioned aspects.
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(2018a), for instance, investigates the fate of priority monism—the view that reality
as a whole is more fundamental than its parts (Schaffer, 2010)—“[i]f spacetime is not
fundamental” (p. 104). The discussion, however, proceeds without specifying what
particular spatiotemporal are at issue, in contrast with what is the practice in the physics
literature.
It should be noted, though, that (parts of) the philosophical literature is arguably pur-
posefully more abstract and general than the physics literature. Both Le Bihan (2018a,
108) and Baron (2020, 2209) variously differentiate between the particular problems that
physics studies and a more general ontological or conceptual issue related to spacetime
emergence. The latter is argued to involve an explanatory conceptual and ontological
task that is not resolved even if a formal mathematical derivation is provided for how
spacetime can be derived from an underlying non-spatiotemporal theory. In a shared
piece, they write:
It is far from clear, however, that the mathematical results alone are up to the
explanatory task. This is because the explanatory question is not just the
question of how we recover one theory or piece of mathematical structure
from another. The question is really seeking an understandable physical
picture of how it is that non-spatiotemporal entities and properties conspire
to produce spatiotemporal ones. What we want is a minimal specification of
the ontology that accompanies the mathematical results at issue, and that
helps us to better grasp the dependent spacetime realist approach (Baron
and Le Bihan, 2021).
We do not dispute that such explanatory work is needed. What we warn against, how-
ever, is to take this need for explanatory work as a reason to discuss spacetime emer-
gence in the abstract rather than with reference to the specific spatiotemporal aspects
and the philosophical issues that accompany their non-fundamentality. This is espe-
cially so if this discussion in the abstract gives the impression of being concerned with
some allegedly exceptional singular problem of spacetime emergence, for instance how it
is “that non-spatiotemporal entities and properties conspire to produce spatiotemporal
ones,” as Baron and Le Bihan writes. There is, as we shall argue, no such additional
exceptional conceptual or ontological problem of ‘spacetime emergence’ over and above
the sum of the philosophical problems relating to the emergence of the various specific
spatiotemporal aspects. Neither is there a shared core in these specific problems that
warrants speaking of “the problem of spacetime emergence in the philosophy of quan-
tum gravity,” as Le Bihan puts it above, and that would justify approaching them in
the abstract.
4 What counts as Spacetime?
But let us approach the matter step by step. In this section, we propose what might
be meant by someone inquiring about the problem of spacetime emergence. Recall that
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this philosophical inquiry is prompted by the development of certain new theories (or
theoretical frameworks) in physics. It is not a problem that is raised in all of physics.
This rather trivial observation makes an, for our purposes, important point: The problem
of spacetime emergence is raised by theories with certain characteristics. If the name of
the problem is anything to go by, what these characteristics are will depend on what is
meant by ‘spacetime’. Thus, what is meant by ‘spacetime’ is crucial for deciding when
this problem occurs and what it involves.
In almost all philosophical studies that investigate ‘spacetime emergence’ we do get at
least some minimal qualification of ‘spacetime’. For example, Le Bihan (2018a) seems to
be interested specifically in the emergence of general-relativistic spacetime, when he qual-
ifies that the candidates for (non-spatiotemporal) fundamental structure are assumed to
be such that “neither our familiar macroscopic space and time nor the spacetime of
general relativity can in general be easily mapped onto these structures” (p. 99). Simi-
larly, Muntean (2015) seems to equate spacetime with the structure known from general
relativity and so does Baron (2020) when he states that “[s]pacetime emerges in the
sense that the laws of general relativity are deducible from a more fundamental theory”
(Baron, 2020, 2209).10
However, what counts as spacetime is already disputed in the context of general
relativity.11 Traditionally, general-relativistic spacetime—in light of the hole argument—
has been identified with the pair of manifold and metric structure 〈M, g〉 (call this the
geometric view). More recently, Knox (2013, 2017) has proposed that spacetime is better
understood as the role of providing an inertial background structure (call this inertial
spacetime functionalism). According to this functionalist view, the pair 〈M, g〉, as a
matter of fact, does not always realise the spacetime role—it is not always that which
provides for inertial background structure. Knox (2013) gives the example of Poincaré
gauge theory, where the general-relativistic constraint of a torsion-free connection is
dropped such that the affine geometry and inertial structure of the theory generally
come apart. As a result, the inertial spacetime functionalist will argue that spacetime
is not in fact realised since there is nothing that realises inertial structure in Poincaré
gauge theory—unless matter only couples to the symmetric, i.e., torsion-free part of
the connection, in which case the theory is simply a reformulation of general relativity.
Proponents of the geometric view will disagree. Since spacetime, on their view, is always
realised by (or simply identical with) the pair 〈M, g〉, spacetime does feature in Poincaré
gauge theory.
Already this debate on purely classical physics signifies that it is disputed what counts
as spacetime. The issue, as exemplified above, is not only that functionalists identify
spacetime with a functional role whereas proponents of the geometric view identify it
with a pair of spatiotemporal aspects, i.e., manifold and metric. Rather, the crucial
10This seems overly restrictive. It would arguably be sufficient, if the laws of general relativity were
recovered approximately.
11This is a semantic sub-question of the overall question ‘what is spacetime?’. Notably, the latter also
includes the famous sub-question for the ontological status of spacetime—including the substantivalist–
relationalist debate—which will, however, not be of interest to us here.
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difference, at least for present purposes, is that they disagree about whether spacetime
actually features in a specific theory. If spacetime functionalists and proponents of the
geometric view disagree whether spacetime is emergent in a given circumstance, they will
arguably also disagree whether any problem of spacetime emergence occurs. According
to spacetime functionalism, a manifold with metric is not sufficient for spacetime. Thus,
in certain cases, a spacetime functionalist could consider spacetime as emergent, even if
the underlying level of description features a manifold with metric. For the spacetime
functionalist this might therefore qualify as an occasion to raise the problem of spacetime
emergence whereas a proponent of the geometric view would reject this since spacetime,
to them, is here still fundamental. Those like, for instance, Niels Linnemann (2020)
who view an ordering structure with spacetime-split as essential to spacetime could
similarly enter a disagreement with proponents of the geometric view whether spacetime
is fundamental or not. A fundamental manifold with metric is not sufficient to secure, say,
an ordering structure with a spacetime-split which additionally requires that the metric
has Lorentzian signature. Conversely, to add a third example, a fundamental ordering
structure with a spacetime-split is not sufficient for having a manifold with metric. This
time, proponents of the geometric view would say that spacetime is non-fundamental
whereas Linnemann would likely disagree. Thus, depending on what spatiotemporal
aspects one regards as necessary for spacetime, different theoretical frameworks with
different fundamental spatiotemporal aspects will be examples of emergent spacetime.
These examples show that it is ambiguous when exactly spacetime is emergent and thus
ambiguous when the problem of spacetime emergence occurs. This ambiguity cannot
be remedied by explaining, as Le Bihan does above, that the concern is cases where
“the spacetime of general relativity” cannot “be easily mapped onto [the underlying]
structures.” Whether such a mapping is possible will depend on what is regarded as
necessary for spacetime and this is already disputed within general relativity.
The moral of the above is that to inquire about the emergence of spacetime one needs
to fill in the details regarding the used notion of spacetime. Trying to preserve the sense
of the phrase ‘the problem’, there are, in our view, four different ways to do so, and,
on top, a fifth option that rejects that any further specification is needed, warranted, or
advisable (see table 2).12
When ‘spacetime’ in ‘the problem of spacetime emergence’ is qualified as the space-
time of general relativity, as is often done, the perhaps most immediate understanding
would be that ‘spacetime’ should be conceived according to one of its interpretations in
the general relativity literature. Thus, what is meant by ‘the problem of spacetime emer-
gence’ can be made clear by giving the specific necessary and sufficient spatiotemporal
aspects that must be there for spacetime to be realised (call this the specific construal
of spacetime). The absence of these spatiotemporal aspects at some underlying level
then gives rise to the problem of spacetime emergence. If several spatiotemporal aspects
are specified as necessary, further specification is needed regarding whether the philo-
sophically interesting problem is meant to occur when none or just one of the necessary
12There is a sense in which all these notions are compatible with what Le Bihan and Baron say about




Entailed understanding of the
spacetime emergence problem
Specific Specific spatiotemporal
aspects are necessary and
sufficient for spacetime.
The problem arises when these spe-
cific spatiotemporal aspects (or a
subset of them) are emergent.
Thick All spatiotemporal aspects
are necessary for space-
time.
The problem permeates all cases
where any spatiotemporal aspect is
emergent.
Thin Any spatiotemporal as-
pect is sufficient for space-
time.
The Problem occurs when all spa-
tiotemporal aspects are emergent.
Cluster No spatiotemporal aspect
is necessary but certain
clusters of them are suffi-
cient for spacetime.
The problem permeates all cases
where no sufficiency condition for
spacetime is satisfied.
Pre-theoretic Spacetime is not
analysable in terms of
spatiotemporal aspects.
The problem concerns the emer-
gence of spacetime as we experi-
ence it, independently of more pre-
cise formal notions.
Table 2: An exhaustive list of possible conceptions of spacetime and corresponding
attitudes towards an overarching problem of spacetime emergence depending on the
conception of the constituent ‘spacetime.’ None of them are viable, as we argue.
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conditions are not satisfied fundamentally, i.e., whether all or just one necessary spa-
tiotemporal aspect is emergent. For instance, concerning the geometric view, it would
have to be specified whether the problem of spacetime emergence occurs when both
metric and manifold are emergent, or just one.
Following the suggestion from section 3 that the philosophical problem of interest is
of a more general character, one might, however, be reluctant to say that the problem
of spacetime emergence occurs only when specific spatiotemporal aspects are emergent.
Rather, it might seem to be a more general problem that arises whenever some spa-
tiotemporal aspect is emergent. In one reading, this suggests that ‘spacetime’ in ‘the
problem of spacetime emergence’ is understood rather restrictively as referring to some-
thing that is only realised in theories where none of the spatiotemporal aspects present
in general relativity are emergent, but all are fundamental. Accordingly, we can speak
of the emergence of spacetime as soon as just one aspect of spacetime is emergent. This
signifies a rather thick conception of spacetime (call it the thick or restrictive construal).
This thick understanding of ‘spacetime’ furthermore appears to abide by the proposal
that the philosophy literature is merely continuing the linguistic practice surrounding
‘spacetime emergence’ in physics. There, spacetime emergence is also routinely invoked
even when only one spatiotemporal aspect is emergent.
Another possibility is to adopt a rather liberal or thin understanding of the notion
‘spacetime’ (call it the thin construal). Here, all necessary conditions are dropped and
any spatiotemporal aspect on its own is sufficient for spacetime. As soon as a theory
includes at least one spatiotemporal aspect, it features spacetime. Adopting this thin
construal of ’spacetime’, the problem of spacetime emergence must then be understood
to occur when all spatiotemporal aspects are emergent, i.e., in theories where no spa-
tiotemporal aspect remains fundamental. On this construal, there is no problem of
spacetime emergence, if just one spatiotemporal aspect remains fundamental, the key
idea being that the problem occurs when the fundamental level is entirely free of any-
thing spatiotemporal.13 This might be what Baron and Le Bihan (2021) identify as the
problem of explaining “how it is that non-spatiotemporal entities and properties conspire
to produce spatiotemporal ones”.
An intermediate alternative to the thin and thick construal of spacetime is to adopt
Baker’s (2020) view of spacetime as a cluster concept (call it the cluster construal).
According to Baker, there are no necessary conditions for what counts as spacetime,
but instead several distinct sufficient conditions. So, similar to the thin construal, it
remains ambiguous what features are at the coarse-grained level where spacetime is said
to emerge. When no spatiotemporal aspect is necessary but certain clusters of them are
sufficient for spacetime, the problem of spacetime emergence can, in turn, be understood
as permeating all cases where no sufficiency condition for spacetime is satisfied at an
underlying level of description. As such, we might regard this as saying that the problem
of spacetime emergence only arises when sufficiently many spatiotemporal aspects are
13What is our interpretation of Baron and Le Bihan (2021), was first explicitly defended by Niels
Linnemann as the ontological problem of minimal spacetime.
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absent at the fundamental level (and not in all cases as the thick construal would have
it). Which exactly these are, however, is not fixed in the cluster conception.
Lastly, there remains the option to reject our reconstruction in terms of spatiotemporal
aspects by opting for a pre-theoretic conception of spacetime (or perhaps even space and
time), e.g., as we experience it. Such a construal wants to take spacetime as unanalysable
in terms of spatiotemporal aspects. In our view, this position places itself in the peculiar
position of not being able to make transparent when the alleged problem occurs and,
upon further specification, will transform into one of the lines of argument discussed
above. Here is why. If the issue is not straightforwardly intended to address why we
experience things as we do (see Ismael (2021) for a preliminary discussion), which is
arguably a problem in cognitive science, the pre-theoretic spacetime must be specified
in terms of some formal structure to be comparable to the structures at an underlying
level of description. If this was not done, it would be impossible to tell whether the pre-
theoretic spacetime is in fact absent, i.e., they would be unable to tell whether a theory
raises problems related to spacetime emergence or not. In other words, the pre-theoretic
construal needs to connect in some way to the physical theories. However, this arguably
requires an analysis in terms of spatiotemporal aspects—at least all our theories employ
spatiotemporal aspects. Thus, this position is, in our view, unstable and will decay into
one of the four other options considered here.
5 The Many Problems of Spacetime Emergence
The previous section gave four proposals for what might be meant by ‘spacetime’ and how
this determines what one takes the problem of spacetime emergence to be. One construal
gave specific necessary and sufficient conditions for ‘spacetime’, thus specifying what
spatiotemporal aspects are tied to this problem. On the thick construal of ‘spacetime’,
the problem occurs for theoretical frameworks where at least one spatiotemporal aspect is
absent (i.e., non-fundamental, i.e., emergent). In contrast, a thin construal of ‘spacetime’
made the problem one that occurs when all spatiotemporal aspects are absent. Finally,
in-between, it followed from the cluster construal that the problem occurs when none of
the sufficiency conditions for spacetime are satisfied.
Now, this section argues that none of these explications of ‘spacetime’ and ‘the problem
of spacetime emergence’ vindicate the existence of any exceptional problem of spacetime
emergence as such. Instead, there are many different interesting philosophical questions
raised by and tied to the emergence of the various specific spatiotemporal aspects; the
examples of emergent dimensionality, Lorentz signature, and metric are to justify this
in the following. Although one might want to group these problems under one label, we
end this section by warning against doing so.
In section 3, we illustrated how spacetime emergence in the physics literature is, for
instance, associated with emergent gravitational dynamics, locality, metric, dimension-
ality, Lorentzian signature, Lorentz invariance, and diffeomorphism invariance (this list
is arguably not exhaustive). Emergent dimensionality was exemplified with the work
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of Steinhaus and Thürigen (2018), who, in the context of loop quantum gravity, in-
vestigates the spectral dimension changes with length scale under the title “Emergence
of spacetime in a restricted spin-foam model.” The number of dimensions is typically
treated as a fixed external parameter associated with topology: a surface is topologi-
cally two-dimensional because it can be divided by a line which can, in turn, be divided
by a point.14. However, as Carlip (2017) observes, we have no direct access to the topo-
logical dimension. Rather, we ascertain the number of dimensions based, for instance,
on how the volume of a sphere scales with its radius (internal scaling dimension) or by
looking at how quickly something diffuses (say, milk in coffee; the rigorous definition is
in terms of a free scalar field). “More dimensions mean [. . . ] slower diffusion—there are
more ‘nearby’ points,” as (Carlip, 2017, 5) points out. The latter is the spectral dimen-
sion investigated by Steinhaus and Thürigen (2018). It is, as they explain, “an effective
dimension as seen by a free scalar field” (Steinhaus and Thürigen, 2018, 1). In general-
relativistic backgrounds, the spectral dimension agrees with the topological dimension,
but the findings of Steinhaus and Thürigen (2018) suggest that in loop quantum gravity,
even though the underlying spin network is topologically four-dimensional, the spectral
dimension will approach zero at small length scales,15 taking fractional values on the
way. Thus, “as seen by a free scalar field,” the number of (spectral) dimensions is scale
dependent and may even take on non-integer values.
These findings raise several conceptual and metaphysical questions. Clearly, it opens a
discussion about the meaning of ‘dimension’. This includes how to tackle circumstances
where the different formal definitions of dimension disagree. Transposing this to meta-
physics, a question might be which of these capture the true dimensionality and which
are merely (sometimes misleading) indicators of the number of dimensions. There is also
a task in building a metaphysics that supports non-integer, scale-dependent dimensions,
and perhaps a further question of whether the zero (spectral) dimensions of the smallest
length scales should be regarded as a special case of dimensionality or as the absence of
dimensionality. There are, in other words, interesting philosophical questions associated
specifically with the emergence of dimensionality.
Another example is emergent Lorentzian signature which, as mentioned above, Sin-
doni (2012, 8) discusses as a situation where “spacetime is emergent.” ‘Signature’ refers
to the sign of the eigenvalues of a metric tensor gµν when represented as a matrix. It can
be expressed by three values that number how many eigenvalues are negative, positive,
and vanishing. In general relativity the metric has Lorentzian signature: in four dimen-
sions it has three eigenvalues with equal sign and one eigenvalue with opposite sign;
(−,+,+,+) according to the standard convention. The difference in sign is responsible
for the fact that two events, aµ and bν , with spatiotemporal distance ds2 = aµbνgµν
can be either spacelike separated (for ds2 > 0), timelike separated (for ds2 < 0), or
lightlike separated (for ds2 = 0). Loosely speaking, the difference in sign captures the
difference between space and time. One scenario with emergent Lorentzian signature
14See Carlip (2017) for a more rigorous definition of topological dimension
15Small length scale here denotes length scales close to the characteristic length scale of the spin
network in question.
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considered by Sindoni (2012, section 9) plays out in a Riemannian background with
positive-definite metric. Here, all eigenvalues have equal sign. So there is no difference
between, in particular, spacelike and timelike separation. The separation between all
events is the same, conventionally assumed to be spacelike whereby this background is
timeless. However, if the scalar fields on this background have non-quadratic kinetic
terms, the effective metric can have Lorentzian signature at the level of the equations of
motion (see Girelli et al. (2009) for further details). In other words, Lorenzian signature
results from dynamical symmetry breaking.16 In this scenario, the split between space
and time—as captured by the signature—is not fundamental but emergent.
Philosophically, it is intriguing to consider that time, or at least a distinction between
spacelike and timelike separation, can emerge from a background where none of these are
fundamental. Relatedly, whether the emergence of time is indeed implied by the emer-
gence of Lorentzian signature or whether emergent signature only entails an emergent
space-time split is another interesting venue of investigation. Linnemann (2020) raises
the question of how to construct a metaphysics that supports the emergence of “a local
split between something time(like) and something space(like)” (p. 14) and answers in
the negative that the spacetime functionalism advocated by Lam and Wüthrich (2020) is
no answer to this question. Thus, another metaphysical framework is needed. Devising
this seems to be an important task for philosophers in light of emergent split implied by
emergent Lorentzian signature. As part of these considerations, we might also inquire
how to understand any alleged transition from a Riemannian phase (without symme-
try breaking) to a Lorentzian phase (with symmetry breaking), if there is no time (see
Huggett and Wüthrich (2018, 1201-1202) for a preliminary discussion).
As a final example of philosophical problems raised by a specific spatiotemporal aspect,
consider metric emergence. This is, for instance, explored by Cao et al. (2017) who
show how a metric might be obtained from entanglement structures in certain states in
Hilbert spaces. They begin with a quantum state ψ in a factorisable Hilbert space H
that is decomposed into factors H = ⊗Np Hp. So, loosely speaking, they assume that
the quantum system can be decomposed into (a large number of) subsystems. The
reduced states of the factors can be entangled and this entanglement can be quantified
through the mutual information.17 Since mutual information is symmetric, we can define
a graph by associating each factor with a vertex and the edge weights with the mutual
information between the reduced states of each pair of factors. Cao et al. (2017) then
show that this graph (or all its connected sub-graphs) can be equipped with a metric
where the distance between two vertices is given as the smallest sum of a function of the
mutual information weights connecting the vertices. They then argue that this distance
can be interpreted as spatial distance.
16We are not making a judgement about the viability of approaches with emergence Lorentzian signa-
ture. As Sindoni (2012, 34-35) emphasises, they face rather significant challenges. It might be interesting
to add that signature change is now considered in the more worked out context of loop quantum cos-
mology (see Brahma (2020)).
17The mutual information between the state of two factors, A and B, is given as I(A, B) = S(A) +
S(B) − S(AB) where S(A) is the entanglement entropy.
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Several philosophical questions are raised if this approach bears out, most immedi-
ately, whether this is in fact an instance of emergence or whether it merely involves
re-representation.18 If the approach shows distance relations to be non-fundamental,
then it challenges, for example, the usual setup of Lewis’ (1994) Humean supervenience
thesis and his modal realism where elements are world-mates if and only if they are spa-
tially distanced (Lewis, 1986). Relatedly, an emergent metric poses problems for what
Schaffer (2001) calls the “spatiotemporal individuation principle” (p. 249) whereby en-
tities are individuated by being at a distance from each other.19
There are, as indicated, interesting and highly relevant philosophical problems to raise
with respect to the emergence of each of these spatiotemporal aspects. We expect that
few will doubt that this is the case. This, however, signifies the challenge faced by those
who want to argue that there is something like the problem of spacetime emergence.
For this to be more than an arbitrary label for one of the many philosophical problems
related to spacetime emergence—or the emergence of spatiotemporal aspects, as we
prefer to say—the problem of spacetime emergence would have to stand out among
them. What is not made explicit, but thought to be exceptional about the problem of
spacetime emergence is precisely what the different construals discussed in section 4 give
an answer to.
According to the thick construal, the problem permeates all cases where any spa-
tiotemporal aspect is emergent. It thus stands by being a problem over and above the
many many problems associated with the emergence of particular spatiotemporal as-
pects. This, furthermore, might warrant seeking its solution in the abstract rather than
in the details of each case. Analogously, the the cluster construal proposes that the
problem permeates all cases where none of the sufficiency conditions for spacetime are
satisfied, and one version of the specific construal similarly proposes that the problem
occurs when any one of the necessary conditions for spacetime are not satisfied. In
other words, all argue that the problem of spacetime emergence is exceptional because
it permeates multiple cases where different spatiotemporal aspects are emergent. In
making this claim, however, these proposals are faced with the task of identifying some
commonality between these cases that this alleged problem could subsume
The issue is that the philosophical problems raised by the different emergent spa-
tiotemporal aspects are not immediately related. For instance, neither emergent dimen-
sionality nor emergent Lorentzian signature challenge the metaphysical frameworks—
Humeanism, modal realism, and spatiotemporal individuation—that are challenged by
emergent metric. Any solution to these challenges, or any other question relating to
emergent metric, seems to have little bearing for what dimensionality is when physics
shows that the number of dimensions can change dynamically. Moreover, such dimen-
sional reduction can, as Carlip (2017, 6) shows, occur in both Riemannian and Lorentzian
backgrounds.20 The question how a transition from Riemannian to Lorentzian signature
18This question has already been raised in the similar context where gravitational dynamics is alleged
to emerge from entanglement dynamics (Jaksland and Linnemann, 2020; Ney, 2021).
19See Jaksland (2020) for a discussion of how mutual information might individuate entities instead).
20Though the difference between Riemannian and Lorentzian signature only exists in two and higher
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is metaphysically possible already assumes a metric whereby issues relating to metric
emergence do not come into play. Hence, the philosophical problems associated with the
emergence of specific spatiotemporal aspects appear to be (sufficiently) independent of
each other. Knowing the answer to one is of little help when seeking the answer to one
of the other.
These differences between the specific problems, and even more so their apparent inde-
pendence, pose a severe challenge to the claim that there is an exceptional problem—the
problem of spacetime emergence—that permeates more cases where different spatiotem-
poral aspects are emergent. Given the apparent differences exemplified by the cases
of emergent dimensionality, signature, and metric, little indicates that there is such a
commonality between the problems they raise.21 This, of course, is no argument that
there is no such shared commonality, but we do think that it places the burden of proof
on those who proclaim its existence.
Those in the literature who allude to the existence of a singular problem of spacetime
emergence in quantum gravity, however, do not provide such an argument. Le Bihan
(2019, 3), for instance, develops his “hard problem of spacetime emergence” in purely
general terms, describing how “[t]he hard problem of spacetime is to account for the ap-
parent explanatory gap, or conceptual discrepancy, between the primitive notions of the
spatio-temporal and the non-spatio-temporal theories” Le Bihan (2019, 8). In using the
plural “notions” and “theories,” we might get the impression that this is a problem that
arises in multiple cases, for instance when different spatiotemporal aspects are emergent,
but Le Bihan only gives the adjacency–locality problem in loop quantum gravity as a
concrete example. While this indicates that there is such an “apparent explanatory gap,”
within some quantum gravity approach—presumably due to metric emergence—it does
little to answer our concern that there is, in fact, no unifying trait between the cases
where different spatiotemporal aspects are emergent as the thick construal would have it.
Most likely, this is therefore not Le Bihan’s aim. Rather, we might get the suspicion that
“the hard problem of spacetime emergence” is not a problem in its own right but rather
a type of problem. It is not itself asking a philosophical question but it instead denotes
a group of different philosophical questions relating to the emergence of spatiotemporal
aspects where an apparent explanatory gap occurs. This interpretation is further sup-
ported when Le Bihan adds that “the specifics of the explanatory gap will vary from one
approach to quantum gravity to another” 2019, 8. Should this be so, however, it only
corroborates our claim here that there are many problems of spacetime emergence, and
it emphasises that also these alleged hard problems should be approached at the level of
the specific emergent spatiotemporal aspects rather than in the abstract.
Any proposal that there is a common core to these many explanatory gap problems
that allows for, and indeed calls for, an abstract approach would simply raise the issue
dimensions, ‘dimension’ here refers to topological dimension which dimensional reduction leaves un-
changed.
21One might reply that all of these cases concern emergence, and the overarching problem might
therefore be related to what emergence is. This question, however, is neither peculiar to spacetime or to
quantum gravity as the alleged overarching question suggests.
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# Non-fundamental spatiotemporal aspect(s)
0 None
1 Space-time split Metric Dimension ...
2 Split + Metric Metric + Dimension Dimension + Split ...
n ... ... ... ...
N Split + Metric + Dimension + ...
Table 3: Table of hypothetical theoretical frameworks corresponding to each cell with
differing non-fundamental spatiotemporal aspects. The single cell in row 0 corresponds
to general relativity and that in row N to the case where all N spatiotemporal aspects
are non-fundamental. For the sake of simplicity only three spatiotemporal aspects are
included explicitly.
anew of what this core might be. Whether framed like this or as the proposal that some
exceptional problem of spacetime emergence is shared many instances where different
spatiotemporal aspects are emergent, we contend that the burden of proof lies with
those making these proposals. However, neither Le Bihan’s nor anyone else in the
literature provides such an argument for the existence of such commonalities between
the emergence of different spatiotemporal aspects.
Table 3 provides another way of parsing these challenge. It depicts various hypotheti-
cal theories with varying spatiotemporal aspects being emergent. The numbers organise
the hypothetical theories in a hierarchy by the number of spatiotemporal aspect that
they take to be emergent. Each cell in the table can thus be interpreted as standing for
a possible world with the same manifest spatiotemporal aspects as in the actual world
but where different (combinations) of them are emergent. The single cell in row 0 corre-
sponds to a world where all spatiotemporal aspects are fundamental. A world according
to general relativity falls in this cell in row 0, assuming that the spatiotemporal aspects
comprise those that are manifest in general relativity (see Le Bihan and Linnemann
(2019) for a discussion). The next row is numbered by 1 since it contains hypothetical
theories where exactly one spatiotemporal aspect is emergent. Row N again only con-
tains one cell since this is the case where all N spatiotemporal aspects are emergent.
Importantly, the numbers should not be associated with levels of description/reality
within one world.
According to the thick construal, the problem of spacetime emergence arises in all rows
except row 0. Above, this proposal was questioned by observing that the philosophical
problems raised in each of the cells in row 1 are rather different. It would thus at least
be highly non-trivial—and therefore in need of an argument—that any problem should
be shared between all these cells. With the table, we can, however, add a further com-
plication. Consider the difference between the problems raised by the cell in row 0 and
the emergent metric cell in row 1. Compare that to the difference between the problem
raised by the emergent dimensionality cell in row 1 and the emergent dimensionality and
metric cell in row 2. In both cases, a difference is that the philosophical issues relating
the emergent metric, like those discussed above, are added. However, in the first case,
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the thick construal will have it that the problem of spacetime emergence is added on top.
The reasoning is that there is a qualitative difference between row 0 and 1 which does not
exist between row 1 and 2. A rather immediate candidate for such a qualitative differ-
ence is, of course, that only row 0 does not raise any problems relating to spacetime—or
spatiotemporal aspects, as we prefer to say. This qualitative difference, however, does
not seem to amount to a problem in itself but merely to a description of the problems
raised in the rows 1-N. Thus, our question stands: When adding, say, metric among
the emergent spatiotemporal aspects, what is the alleged qualitative difference between
therefore moving from row 0 to 1 as compared to moving from 1 to 2? An analogous
issue can be raised about the cluster construal but here we are concerned instead with
the alleged qualitative difference in moving from a cell where some sufficiency condition
for spacetime is satisfied to a cell where none of them is satisfied. Finally this issue also
applies to the variant of the special construal where the problem of spacetime emergence
occurs when just one of the necessary conditions for spacetime are not satisfied.
Table 3, however, is particularly useful for illustrating a challenge to the proposal—
associated with the thin construal—that the problem of spacetime emergence only occurs
when all spatiotemporal aspects are non-fundamental. On this understanding, the prob-
lem of spacetime emergence is one that arises when moving from the next to last to the
last row of table 3. Since there is only one cell in this row, the thin construal avoids
the issue of arguing that the same problem occurs in many different cells as, for in-
stance, the thick construal argues. Instead, however, the thin construal has to argue
that there is a philosophical problem raised by formal frameworks falling in the cell in
row N that is exceptional as compared to the many problems occurring in the cells in
the other rows. Otherwise, this cell just raises more problems related to spatiotemporal
aspects without singling out any one of them, i.e., more problems of the same kind.
Suppose for the sake of argument that we have resolved all philosophical issues relating
to the non-fundamentality of dimensionality and metric, respectively. This is arguably
no guarantee against additional problems arising in the cell in row 2 where both are non-
fundamental at the same time. This ordinary proliferation of problems resulting from
complexity takes place whenever we move down the rows in table 3. Observing that
there are problems that only arise when all spatiotemporal aspects are non-fundamental
is therefore not sufficient to single this case out. Rather, for the problem of spacetime
emergence to be exceptional in any way, proponents of the thin construal would have to
argue that the case where all spatiotemporal aspects are non-fundamental generates a
problem that is qualitatively different from those arising from complexity when moving
from, for instance, row 1 to row 2 in table 3. They would have to show that, say, adding
emergent split to the case where all spatiotemporal aspects but split are already emer-
gent is generating a qualitatively different problem as compared to the problems arising
when adding emergent split to, say, emergent metric. Furthermore, this extra problem
must be the same irrespective of which cell in row N-1 that one compares to, i.e., the
same problem must arise irrespective of whether metric, split, etc. is added as the “last”
emergent spatiotemporal aspect.
On these grounds, we find it questionable that such a problem should exist and any
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claim to the contrary would, in our view, be in need of a good argument. Without such
an argument, we find it warranted to assume that the philosophical problems raised
when all spatiotemporal aspects are non-fundamental are just more of the same kind of
problems that arise when one or more spatiotemporal aspects are non-fundamental, i.e,
of the same kind as those philosophical problems that arise in all the other cells of table
3. Furthermore, the proposal that an exceptional problem arises when all spatiotemporal
aspects are non-fundamental also entails a rather peculiar dependence on what exactly
we include among the spatiotemporal aspects. Overlooking one of these aspects or
adding one that should not be included will easily make us mistaken when this problem
arises.
Finally, these issues are also faced by the variant of the specific construal where
the problem of spacetime emergence occurs when none of the necessary conditions for
spacetime is satisfied. On this construal, the problem is also tied to a specific cell
in table 3, though which one will depend on the specific conditions. For purposes of
argument, let split and metric be necessary and sufficient for spacetime. Again, the
issue is to argue that the problem arising in this cell (in this example in row 2 of the
table), is qualitatively different from those philosophical issues that are raised elsewhere;
especially those arising in the emergent split and emergent metric cells, respectively.
In conclusion, neither the specific, the thick, the thin, nor the cluster construal can
single out a problem among the many problems related to the emergence of spatiotem-
poral aspects. Any claim would the contrary would require a substantial argument and
no such argument is currenctly offered in the literature. None of them succeeds at iden-
tifying an exceptional problem that can qualify as the problem of spacetime emergence.
Rather, the discussion indicates that none of the many philosophical problems associated
with the emergence of spatiotemporal aspects is exceptional. Each cell of table 3 raises
interesting but different philosophical issues. While none of these philosophical problems
is as such singled out, it is arguably still a matter of linguistic convention whether to de-
note one or a grouping of them by ‘problem of spacetime emergence’. Proponents of the
specific construal—and perhaps to a lesser degree the other construals—might indeed ar-
gue that what spacetime really is is captured by their necessary and sufficient conditions,
such as metric and manifold, and thus insist that the problem of spacetime emergence
strictly concerns that cell specifically. Even so, however, there are clearly more philo-
sophical issues related to the emergence of spatiotemporal aspects. In our view, this
proliferation is a reason why it is in general ill-advised to speak in terms of ‘problem
of spacetime emergence’. Doing so, we think, risks (1) obscuring the centrality of the
specific spatiotemporal aspect, and (2) impeding the investigation of other interesting
spacetime-related problems that do not involve the emergence of the spatiotemporal
aspect(s) of choice.
(1) If a problem arises in the context of metric emergence, it is hardly helpful if it
is formulated in a way that could also associate it with, for instance, emergent
dimensionality or an emergent space-time split. As such, formulating such specific
problems in general terms obscures the centrality of the spatiotemporal aspect in
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the set-up—and thus presumably also for solving—the problem.
(2) If the connection to, say, the metric is emphasised, but the problem of interest is
nevertheless cast as a problem of spacetime emergence, then this might furthermore
convey the impression that said problem is the only or at least the most important
issue relating to spacetime emergence; an effect that is only amplified if this is
cast as the problem of spacetime emergence. However, as indicated above there
are arguably many interesting philosophical issues associated with the emergence
of many spatiotemporal aspects. All of these deserve philosophical scrutiny, but
this may be overlooked if the label ‘problem of spacetime emergence’ is used only
for very few of them.
Related issues arise if one proposes to use ‘problem of spacetime emergence’ about
any problem relating to the emergence of spatiotemporal aspects despite the fact that
these problems are very different. While this is, in a sense, in line with the established
practice in physics, doing so will again be prone to move the debate away from the level
of detail—particular to each spatiotemporal aspect—required for a proper discussion of
such problems. It is, of course, admissible to say some problem is a problem of spacetime
emergence but following the practice of the physics literature, it is then important to
also specify what is at issue in further detail including the spatiotemporal aspect under
consideration.
One might object that casting the problem in terms of spacetime rather than, for
instance, metric emergence can lift it away from the mathematical formalism and thereby
towards more conceptual modes of inquiry. This could be a valuable point, if it were not
the case that these problems relating to emergence—and thus their solution—precisely
depend on the details of the spatiotemporal aspects in question, as we shall argue in the
next section. There, we will also make the point that this prominence of the specific
spatiotemporal aspects entails that few, or perhaps none, of the associated philosophical
issues permeate all the currently competing quantum gravity approaches.
6 “In various ways”
In accordance with the sentiment that there is an exceptional problem of spacetime emer-
gence in quantum gravity, the philosophical literature can at places give the impression
that the different approaches to quantum gravity feature the same kind of spacetime
emergence and thus the same problem. Le Bihan, for instance, describes how “many
approaches to quantum gravity such as loop quantum gravity or string theory are of-
ten interpreted as denying the fundamental reality of spacetime” (Le Bihan, 2018a, 97,
emphasis in original).22 Likewise, Baron explains that in quantum gravity “there is an
22Note that we take ‘fundamental’ as the relevant claim here, ignoring the additional existence-talk. It
is not at issue whether spacetime is real only if it is fundamental or can be real although it is emergent.
What is at issue is whether something dubbed ‘spacetime’ is fundamental or emergent (following, for
example, ?). For this, it is irrelevant which criteria for existence one adopts. Hence, we suppress the
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expectation that spacetime will be an emergent phenomenon in whatever the correct
account turns out to be” (Baron, 2021, 387). The problem—or problems—relating to
spacetime emergence might hence be taken to be shared between all these “many ap-
proaches” where spacetime is not fundamental.23 In this section, however, we shall argue
that the respective character of spacetime emergence in the competing quantum gravity
approaches is currently rather different, loop quantum gravity and string theory being
good examples of this. This point is echoing Huggett and Wüthrich’s (2013, 277) remark
that spacetime emerges “in various ways”. Notably, however, we argue that this shows
the importance of specifying not only the spatiotemporal aspect in question, as argued
above, but also the quantum gravity approach of interest. There are many problems
of spacetime emergence and they each concern the specific quantum gravity approaches
rather than all of them. We therefore warn against remarks that could give an impression
to the contrary.
Huggett and Wüthrich discussed different approaches to quantum gravity and “ob-
served that the seriousness of these challenges depends a great deal on what they [the dif-
ferent approaches; our remark] postulate instead of spacetime” (Huggett and Wüthrich,
2013, p. 277). In particular, Huggett and Wüthrich argue that “[d]ifferent theories leave
more or less of the standard structure of spacetime intact” (Huggett and Wüthrich,
2013, p. 277), hence one should “pose the challenge of empirical incoherence [which is
their object of investigation; our remark] to them separately” (Huggett and Wüthrich,
2013, p. 277). For example, causal set theory arguably does away with the metric, but
keeps fundamental causal relations from which the familiar general-relativistic spacetime
is then understood to emerge. Similarly, the metric is absent in the formalism of loop
quantum gravity, and hence arguably best interpreted as emergent. In string theory,
however, we do find a fundamental metric structure as central to the formalism. On
the other hand, string theory needs dimensional reduction which is not the case in loop
quantum gravity. So, at least prima facie, spacetime emergence is very different in string
theory and loop quantum gravity or causal set theory. All three approaches might be
said to feature spacetime emergence, but they do so “in various ways” indeed.
This stresses that the consideration of the specific spatiotemporal aspects does mat-
ter given the current landscape of quantum gravity research. The differences between
causal set theory, loop quantum gravity, and string theory exemplify the challenge of
treating them collectively in discussions about spacetime emergence. This is only further
complicated since these differences cannot be captured as differences in degree—unlike
what Huggett and Wüthrich’s ‘more or less’ and similar remarks in their paper seem
to suggest.24 But if the differences are not simply differences in degree, then it is not
existence issue here.
23Following Le Bihan’s suggestion of a “hard problem of spacetime emergence” discussed in section
5, his remark should perhaps rather be interpreted as suggesting that the same conceptual issue arises
and not be considered as the claim that the spacetime emergence is of the same kind in the different
quantum gravity approaches. If this is so, however, it is not very clear from the context.
24Reading Huggett and Wüthrich (2013) more closely does reveal a more nuanced view, though. While
they write, on the one hand, that “[q]uantum gravity’s denial of the ‘spacetimehood’ of the fundamental
structure thus comes in degrees” and “[w]e thus find a spectrum of theories with increasingly iconoclastic
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adequate either to say that one’s spacetime emergence problem of interest is ‘general’
in the sense that it occurs in all approaches with a sufficient degree of emergent space-
time. This does, of course, permit the view that any philosophical problem relating to
the emergence of a particular spatiotemporal aspect is relevant in all current or future
approaches where this aspect is emergent. Still, the discussion should take place at this
level of specificity and not as unspecified discussions of spacetime emergence in quantum
gravity.
This is also relevant to those who explore the implications of spacetime emergence
in quantum gravity for general philosophical issues, for instance, existing metaphysical
frameworks like Humeanism. We are now turning to this issue and explain why specificity
is needed in these debates as well. So, here is why specificity is key in philosophical
debates. We have already mentioned that, for instance, Le Bihan (2018a) argues—
in the abstract—that “priority monism is in tension with many research programs in
quantum gravity” on the basis that “promising approaches to quantum gravity such
as loop quantum gravity or string theory deny the fundamental reality of spacetime”
(p. 95). Notably, however, there is no indication why Schaffer should be committed
to, say, a fundamental metric. All Schaffer’s view seems to require is some unifying
structure that allows for the derivative parts being contiguous. While a priority monist
would arguably not mind learning that the metric (i.e., distance relations) is emergent,
emergent contiguity (due to emergent adjacency relations, for example) is likely to pose a
severe threat to the position. Accordingly, the assessment of Schaffer’s proposal depends
on the specific details of what it is that is emergent.
Similarly, also the fate of Lewis-inspired metaphysics, typically dubbed Humeanism,
depends on the details of what it is that is emergent in the various approaches. However,
again, these details are often not discussed in the literature. For instance, Daniel Dohrn
only very generally comments that he has “doubts as to whether fundamental physics
can be reconciled with Humean metaphysics”, since “according to our best theories
of quantum gravity, the world is not fundamentally spatio-temporal” (Dohrn, 2020,
19). Now, arguably (and contrary to the Schaffer case), traditional Humeanism would
be bothered by an emergent distance structure, since it is distance relations that are
the world-making relations for the Humean (see Jaksland (2021)).25 But it is unclear
why Humeanism should be bothered by, say, an emergent spacetime-split or emergent
re-conceptions of ‘spacetime”’ (Huggett and Wüthrich, 2013, p. 277), they also point out the following:
there really is no single ‘spectrum’ of cases, linearly ordered by some single factor encap-
sulating the ‘spacetiminess’ of the structures in question. Instead, one should picture the
situation as more akin to an at best partially ordered field of theories in a space with mul-
tiple dimensions corresponding to ways in which these structures depart from relativistic
spacetimes. In particular, the way one might rank theories conceptually, according to how
much of the concept of spacetime they maintain, does not always align with the ranking ac-
cording to the ease with which putative local beables or their surrogates can be found. [. . . ]
We now proceed to describe six types of departures from relativistic spacetimes, loosely
ordered in decreasing similarity to relativistic spacetimes. (Huggett and Wüthrich, 2013,
p. 277)
25We may understand this version of Humeanism as being mainly concerned with the question of how
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dimensionality. Thus, when investigating potential issues for metaphysical programmes
like Humeanism sufficient specificity is required.
This task is actually nicely met by Lam and Wüthrich (2021) who study the impact
of specific theories of quantum gravity like loop quantum gravity and causal set theory
on metaphysical conceptions of laws of nature like Humeanism, primitivism, and dispo-
sitionalism. In particular, they concretely analyse which spatiotemporal aspects pose a
threat to certain forms of Humeanism.
7 Conclusion
Modern physics is discussed to raise the issue of the non-fundamentality of spacetime,
usually dubbed the problem of spacetime emergence. We first noticed that the related
discussions in physics are typically concerned with the status of specific spatiotemporal
aspects, while the philosophical debate often lacks this specificity.
We then argued that it is ambiguous what ‘spacetime’ is supposed to refer to and of-
fered an exhaustive list of five construals of spacetime and the resulting alleged problem
of spacetime emergence. Furthermore, the different theories of quantum gravity do not
hint at any shared problem of spacetime emergence, and, in particular, they do not hint
at any exceptional problem. Instead, we argued that there are many different specific
problems, all of which are important and must be approached in their own specificity.
Referring to these problems in the abstract as ‘the problem of spacetime emergence’
might preclude precisely this. This is not a step backwards for the philosophical inves-
tigation of spacetime in quantum gravity but a step forward since specificity is what is
required to resolve many of the outstanding issues as section 6 exemplified.
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Wüthrich for helpful discussion. Furthermore, we thank the audiences at the 8th Biennial
Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association (EPSA21) in Turin and
The 20th European Conference on Foundations of Physics in Paris for discussions and
comments.
the facts of the mosaic are ensured to be facts about the same world. There might be other versions
of Humeanism that, with respect to the type of issue at hand, focus on the very need of some mosaic-
enabling structure as such. In this case, the issue is adjacency rather than distance: what is needed is
some structure that ‘spreads out’ the facts.
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